Search results for "Deposit insurance"
showing 7 items of 7 documents
Contagion and Bank Runs in a Multi-Agent Financial System
2012
In this work we explore contagion from one institution to another that can stem from the existence of a network of financial contracts. In fact, in modern financial systems, an intricate web of claims and obligations links the balance sheets of a wide variety of intermediaries (banks, for instance) into a network structure of interdependencies that have created an environment for feedback elements to generate amplified responses to shocks to the financial system. Small shocks, which initially affect only a few institutions, can indeed spread by contagion to the rest of the financial sector and cause a crisis in the connected intermediaries. Whether the financial crisis does spread depends c…
How Do Insured Deposits Affect Bank Risk? Evidence from the 2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act
2017
Abstract This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.
Enhancing Bank Transparency: A Re-assessment
2001
Transparency regulation aims at reducing financial fragility by strengthening market discipline. There are however two elementary properties of banking that may render such regulation inefficient at best and detrimental at worst. First, an extensive financial safety net may eliminate the disciplinary effect of transparency regulation. Second, achieving transparency is costly for banks, as it dilutes their charter values, and hence it also reduces their private costs of risk-taking. We consider both the direct costs of complying with disclosure requirements and the indirect transparency costs stemming from imperfect property rights governing information and specify the conditions under which…
Structures and Trends in German Banking
2004
In this paper, we investigate the claim that German banks are special compared to banks in other industrialised economies. We show that banks are of particular importance to the German economy - as financial intermediary, as lender to the corporate sector, and as part of the corporate governance system. Further, German banks are supervised by two supervisory institutions and have the highest deposit insurance in the world. And last but not least, German banks are numerous, perform poorly, and are part of a historically grown three-pillar system. Hence, German banks can indeed be characterised as unique when compared to other industrialised economies.
Determinants of net interest margin: the effect of capital requirements and deposit insurance scheme
2019
This paper analyzes the determinants of net interest margin with a focus on the impact of capital regulation and deposit insurance. We extend the Ho and Saunders (1981) family of models to explicit...
Corporate Governance of Banks after the Financial Crisis - Theory, Evidence, Reforms
2010
Poor corporate governance of banks has increasingly been acknowledged as an important cause of the recent financial crisis. Given the developments since the Asian financial crisis in 1997, this fact is not readily to be explained. Listed banks and even non-listed firms worldwide have publicly emphasized that good corporate governance is of vital concern for the company, and have adopted firm-specific corporate governance codices. Moreover, banking supervisors have taken up the issue. In particular, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has already published two editions of a guideline entitled “Enhancing corporate governance for banking organisations” which perfectly reflects the super…
Persistency of window dressing practices in the US repo markets after the GFC: The unexplored role of the deposit insurance premium
2022
We investigate whether the regulatory improvements made in the aftermath of the global financial crisis have been effective in limiting bank downward window dressing by means of repos in the United States. We find that a strict application of the Basel III regulation wipes out incentives to engage in window dressing to bolster the level of leverage Tier 1 ratio at quarter-end. We also show that the persistency of window dressing is related to the computation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation assessment base, which motivates banks to engage in window dressing to reduce the deposit insurance premium.